Abstract-This paper presentes an approach to discern MCUs from SEUs in SRAM memories. Experiments involving radiation tests with 14-MeV neutrons on two successive generations (130 and 90 nm) of Cypress devices are presented.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
T IS well-known that the content of Static Random Access Memories (SRAMs) can be corrupted due to the impact of energetic particles present in the environment where they operate, or from radioactive impurities [1] . Most of the times, only the cell hit by the impinging particle is flipped, thereby causing a Single Event Upset (SEU). But sometimes, the charge generated by the particle is shared by adjacent cells, thereby provoking a multiple event. In order to prevent several cells from the same word being affected by the same particle (Multiple Bit Upsets or MBUs), memories in modern technologies feature bit interleaving. This makes MBUs very unlikely to occur. Multiple Cell Upsets (MCUs) may occur instead, but they are easily recoverable with techniques based on error correction codes (ECC).
A widespread procedure to calculate the cross section of a device is the so-called "static tests". In this context, a static test consists in writing the memory with a pattern, exposing the device to a particle beam, and reading the memory only after the irradiation. There are also the so-called "pseudostatic" tests, in which the memories are periodically read during the irradiation, combined with long intervals of time in static mode.
However, a problem that arises in static tests is the accumulation of data. When radiation static tests are performed, a large set of addresses with bitflips sorted increasingly are obtained, and it is difficult to discriminate MCUs from SEUs. Only a knowledge of the physical layout would help to decide if two events are caused by a unique particle. However, this information is usually restricted and therefore, alternative techniques are needed. In Reference [2] , the authors, after making a complete and well-referenced review of the state-ofthe-art techniques to discriminate single from multiple events, proposed that the MCUs must not be identified in the address vector but in a new vector built subtracting the addresses in pairs. Once the so-called Difference-of-Addresses Vector (DAV) is plotted as an histogram, some values appear many more frequently than the bulk of possible values. Thus, they are attributed to MCUs and the addresses originating these anomalies identified. This procedure has successfully been used to study FPGAs and proposed, but not verified, for SRAMs.
In this paper, we propose a modification of the procedure shown in [2] . The main difference is that we propose to investigate the values that appear too frequently after XORing (and not substracting) the addresses with bitflips. The main advantage of this procedure is that it is possible to accurately predict the expected frequency of values in a system where only SEUs occur and compare the predicted figures with the actual ones. In other words, the existence of a theoretical model provides a well-founded reason to find the values that, probably, link addresses involved in one multiple event. We have validated this approach with experimental data issued from experiments in commercial Cypress SRAM memories with 15 MeV neutrons, in the GENEPI2 neutron source [3] , [4] . Data obtained in high-altitude environments have been included in the full length paper sent to IEEE Tran. Nucl. Sci.
II. STATISTICAL PROPERTIES OF THE DAV
Let U N be the address space of a SRAM (N being the length of the address word); and V N,q , the set of q addresses where bitflips have been detected. Therefore, U N can be represented as the set of natural numbers between 0 and L N = 2 N − 1, N ∈ N, which can be codified in binary format as words of length N . The subset V N,q = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v q } ⊂ U N , is built by taking q elements of U N , without repetition and arranging them increasingly. Now, let us define the XORed Difference-of-Addresses vector (XDAV ) as the set of elements of U N obtained from V N,q as:
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Both sets share the following properties. First, as ∀i,
every element in XDAV or CDAV are higher than 0 and lower or equal to L N . Besides, it is easy to demonstrate that the number of elements in both sets is:
The CDAV was successfully used in [2] to detect multiple events. However, the XDAV has an important property, absent in the CDAV, that allows automating the detection of multiple events. This property is the conservation of the probability in special circumstances. The random election of . When this number is XORed bit to bit with another element,
, the bits inside b k ⊕ c k are also random with a probability of being 0 (or 1) equal to 50%. Therefore, as the values of the bits in v k ⊕ v j are equiprobable and independent of the rest of bits, its creation is formally equivalent to randomly taking v k ⊕ v j from {1, 2, . . . , L N } with identical probability. This probability is:
On the contrary, it can be demonstrated that the probability of x ∈ CDAV being k is:
The absence of symmetry in this distribution makes its study very difficult and unaccesible unlike the much simpler Eq. 4. Typically, SEUs appear in randomly distributed addresses of the tested memory, not related to each other. Therefore, the set of addresses is formally equivalent to the subset V N,q , described in the previous subsection. Thus, in only-SEU systems, the elements of XDAV can be supposed to be randomly and uniformly chosen from {1, 2, . . . , L N }. The following question arises: Which is the probability of a value m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L N } appearing k times in the XDAV ? According to the theory, the probability of an element appearing k-times in the XDAV is:
Immediately, the predicted number of elements repeated ktimes in the XDAV is:
Data from actual experiments can be used to obtain the XDAV with the addresses where bitflips were observed. Next, the XDAV can be analyzed to obtain the histogram of the natural numbers m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L N } appearing in it. The final step is finding out the number of elements that appear k−times in it. In only-SEU systems, this parameter should be identical to Eq. 7 so any significant deviation between actual and predicted values will be a hint of the presence of MCUs and help to find the signature by relating addresses in the MCUs. This step is equivalent to the seek of anomalous frequencies in the histogram depicted by Wirthlin et al. in [2] .
Another interesting property of the XDAV is that the theoretical number of elements with k ones in binary format is:
This fact is easily demonstrated since it is formally equivalent to the classic problem of obtaining k heads after tossing a coin N times, and repeating the experiment N DAV times. The detection of elements anomalously close to each other is a well-known and multidisciplinar technique. For example, the detection of MCUs is quite similar to the detection of star clusters on the night sky. Besides, it is possible to demonstrate that, in the XDAV , the probability of finding k consecutive ones (or zeros) in an element of N bits, with k > 0.5 · N , is:
Deviations from this predictions must be interpreted as evidence of the existence of multiple events. Both Equations 7 and 8 will be used to compute the theoretical values used later in Section IV. Eq. 9 is actually an alternative to Eq. 8 that allows studying the problem from another perspective, and that leads to very similar results from issued with of Eq. 8.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
A. Experimental setup
Two commercial 2M×8 CMOS SRAMs, the CY62167DV and CY62167EV, from Cypress Semiconductors and in 130 & 90 nm technologies, were irradiated in the 15-MeV neutron source of the GENEPI2 facility, which was recently used for the first time to perform radiation ground test experiments on integrated circuits [3] , [5] . The memories were irradiated at their nominal power supply (3.3 V) with different patterns (0 × 00, 0 × F F , 0 × 55) in rounds of about 1 hour, and they received a total neutron fluence of 0.7-1.1·10 8 n/cm 2 . Since the memories were checked every 45 s, these were "pseudo-static" tests. More than 100 errors were observed in each round, but never more than 7 errors were detected in the reading cycles. Next, the addresses were sorted by increasing value as they had been obtained in a static test.
B. The GENEPI2 neutron source
GENEPI2 (GEnerator of NEutrons Pulsed and Intense)
facility is located at the LPSC (Laboratoire de Physique Subatomique et Cosmologie) in Grenoble, France. Since 2013, this accelerator has been used to irradiate integrated circuits from different technologies [3] , [5] . It is an electrostatic accelerator producing neutrons by impinging a deuteron beam onto a fixed target. The target contains either Tritium (T) or Deuterium (D) according to the required neutron energy. After acceleration, Neutron production is monitored to determine the neutron dose for each irradiation. Early 2015, a fresh tritium target was installed, generating a maximum neutron flux of 4.5 x 10 7 n · cm −2 · s −1 . Under these conditions, DUTs are exposed to a dose of 1.6 x 10 11 n · cm −2 within one hour. This result is valid after this year's update, but the experiments of this paper were carried out 24 months ago.
IV. RESULTS
First of all, it is necessary to compute the XDAV and calculate the number of times every element is repeated. Most of the elements never appear but a small fraction of them can appear twice or even more as Eq. 7 indicates. let us pay attention on the raw data obtained in the experiments (black stars) in comparison with the theoretical value (stright black line). There are dots that strongly deviate from the predictions deduced from Eq. 7. For instance, 0 × 00C000 appears 13 times in XDAV, even though the probability of a value appearing 13 of times in the XDAV is 2.7 × 10 −35 . A similar deviation applies to 0×000006, which appears 6 times, and 5 and 2 elements appear 4 and 3 times, respectively. Thus, one immediately concludes that these data are not compatible with an only-SEUs system and that MCUs are among the bulk of bitflips. A similar study can be done for the 130-nm SRAM with the 0 × 00 pattern (Fig. 1b) . Those elements that appear too often are candidates to link addresses in the same event.
Now, let the trace of an element e ∈ XDAV be the number of 1s existing in it. Typically, adjacent cells only differ in the least significant bits of the address used in the column and/or row decoder. In consequence, the XDAV element relating neighbor cells must contain a large numer of 0s, issued from XORing identical values, and very few bits equal to 1. Elements in the XDAV vector with trace close to 1 are candidates to MCUs. Fig. 2a compares the occurrence (Y-axis) of elements with k ones (X-axis) in the SRAMs with the 0 × 00 pattern. One can see that Eq. 8 accurately predicts the experimental results. However, if the left side of the distribution (zoomed in Fig. 2b) , disagreements appear. Obviously, the reason of this discrepancy is the existence of MCUs. Some values with 1 or 2 ones had been discovered in Fig. 1 but others were not. Now, let us focus on the 130-nm memory. In this case, there is an exceptionally frequent value, 0 × 000100, appearing 13 times (Fig. 2b) . The other two possible candidates, 0×000010 and 0 × 080000, only appear once, so they can be just the result of randomness. However, among the elements with 2 ones, one can observe that, apart from 0 × 010001, there are two elements 0 × 000110 and 0 × 080100, that only appear once and that can be derived by combining 0 × 000100, the recently accepted critical value with 13 times, with 0×000010 and 0 × 080000, respectively. In conclusion, hints to consider these values as MCU signatures are really strong, backed up by the fact that the related addresses appeared in the same round. In the 90-nm memory, a similar study can be done.
Strange values such as 0 × 1E1F 70, 0 × 1E1F 7F in Fig.  1a are just the result of the interaction between pairs of events with large multiplicity. Table I shows the critical values, anomalously overrepresented, attributed to the occurrence of MCUs. Table II classifies the events, according to their multiplicity.
V. DISCUSSION
The approach proposed in this paper has proved to be quite successful and computationally efficient. It is clear that the MCUs shown in this paper could have been discovered by careful visual inspection. However, in some situations that is completely unfeasible. For example, in later tests with 14 MeV neutrons, the authors have observed more than 1500 bitflips in only one 5-minutes round.
On the other hand, unfortunately some of the MCUs were not detected with this method. This happens only when the addresses are related with an uncommon XDAV value, impossible to extract from the background. However, it has beeen observed that the uncertainty introduced by the undetected MCUs is much smaller than the statistic error margin issued from the relatively low number of events.
Finally, another interesting point is the relationship about the anomalous values in the XDAV vector and the implementation of the interleaving. This information is not usually at the disposal of the users but some interesting data can be deduced from Table I . The most interesting fact is that it is doubtlessly demonstrated that in the transition from 130 to 90 nm, not only did the transistor size decreased, but there was also a change in the organization of internal blocks. If the organization had not changed, the critical XDAV values would be similar and this is not true.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented an approach to discern MCUs from SEUs in data issued from static radiation tests. It has been successfully tested on two 90-nm and 130-nm commercial Cypress SRAMs. The distribution of the observed MCUs also allowed to observe modifications in the interleaving implemented in these two successive generations of memories.
